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I. Introduction
In December 2013, civil war in South Sudan erupted between the "Sudan Peo-
ple's Liberation Movement" and the "Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In-
Opposition".' A political struggle between Salva Kiir, South Sudan's President,
and Riek Machar, South Sudan's former/current Vice-President contributed
greatly to the conflict. 2 Despite political roots, the conflict has ethnic and familial
ties through which soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group aligned with President
Kiir and soldiers from the Nuer ethnic group aligned with Machar. 3 The resulting
violence has led to innumerable human rights abuses including the direct target-
ing of civilians by armed groups, ethnic cleansing, rape and sexual violence,
destruction of property and looting, arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced disap-
pearances, and the use of child soldiers.4 In August 2015, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development, an eight-country trade bloc in Africa, mediated the
"Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan",
* JD Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in South Sudan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RiL., http://www.cfr
.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/civil-war-in-south-sudan (last visited Oct. 19,
2017).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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also known as the "Compromise Peace Agreement".5 The aforementioned agree-
ment provided for the creation of an independent hybrid judicial court, the Hy-
brid Court for South Sudan ("HCSS"), to be established by the African Union
Commission to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of individuals respon-
sible for violations of international and national law since the beginning of the
conflict. 6 Shortly thereafter, Kiir and Macher spoke out against the HCSS, and
instead advocated for a "national truth and reconciliation commission".7 Since
the August 2015 ratification, the African Union and South Sudanese government
have taken little to no concrete steps to set-up the court and prosecute those
accountable for gross violations of international and national law.8 In June 2016,
the conflict resumed resulting in further civilian killings, rapes and sexual vio-
lence, property destruction and looting.9
The continuation of this conflict underscores the need for the HCSS's estab-
lishment to ensure accountability, promote deterrence, and encourage sustainable
peace. The establishment of the HCSS is preferable to the "national truth and
reconciliation commission" proposed by Kiir and Machar as the sole means of
transitional justice in South Sudan because truth is not an alternative to justice.
II. Background
A. Formation of South Sudan and the South Sudanese Civil War
In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence from Sudan
following a six-year peace process beginning with the "Comprehensive Peace
Agreement" and culminating in a national referendum, thereby becoming the
newest country in the world. 10 Five years after gaining independence, violence
erupted between presidential guard soldiers in the country's capital on December
15, 2013.'1 Soldiers of the Dinka ethnic group aligned with South Sudanese Pres-
ident, Salva Kiir, and those of the Nuer ethnic group aligned with former vice
president, Riek Machar. 1 2 On December 16, 2013, Kiir appeared on state televi-
sion to declare that he had successfully suppressed a coup led by Machar, certain
5 Id.
6 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, NDFSS-SPLM/SPLA-10-
Former Detainees-Political Parties of South Sudan, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTH. ON DEV. (Aug. 17,
2015), https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final-proposed-compromise-agreement-for
south sudanconflict.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on Resolution].
7 Salva Kiir & Riek Machar, South Sudan Needs Truth, Not Trials, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/opinion/south-sudan-needs-truth-not-trials.html? r-2.
8 South Sudan: One Year Since Peace Deal, Justice Still Elusive for Victims, AMNESTY INT'L (Aug.
17, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/south-sudan-one-year-since-peace-deal-jus-
tice-still-elusive-for-victims/.
9 Id.
10 South Sudan Profile - Overview, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-
africa-14019208; UNMIS, U.N. MIssioN IN SUDAN, https://unmis.unniissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515
(last visited Oct. 18, 2017); UNMISS Background, U.N. MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF S. SUDAN, http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/background.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
1 Global Conflict Tracker, supra note 1; UNMISS Background, supra note 10.
12 Global Conflict Tracker, supra note 1.
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ex-cabinet ministers, and officials.1 3 Subsequently, the outbreak of violence esca-
lated and civil war erupted throughout South Sudan within the same month. 14
The root of the conflict stems from the political power struggle between Kiir, an
ethnic Dinka, and Machar, an ethnic Nuer.1 5 Though, it should be noted that the
conflict's course and escalation is heavily influenced by a history of violence and
ethnic tension in the region.' 6 Both Kiir and Machar are backed by their respec-
tive political parties, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement ("SPLM") and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In-Opposition ("SPLM-IO") each of
which are generally divided along the aforementioned ethnic lines.1 7
Since the initial outbreak of violence in December 2013, an estimated 50,000
people have been killed, over 1.6 million individuals have been displaced, and
around 200,000 individuals are seeking protection on United Nations Missions
bases throughout the country.' 8 The violence has resulted in famine, disease and
the flight of thousands of South Sudanese citizens to neighboring countries that
lack adequate resources to offer aid.1 9 Reports have established that armed
forces on both sides are deliberately targeting civilians along ethnic lines as part
of their military tactics. 20 Since the start of the conflict in December 2013, there
have been thousands of civilian deaths and numerous human rights violations,
including forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and much more. More-
over, there have been serious war crimes, such as attacks on medical workers, aid
workers, media personal, and places of worship. 2' As of November 2016, the
UN Security Council reports that the violence has not only continued, but human
rights violations perpetrated by SPLM and SPLM-IO "are taking on an increas-
13 Douglas H. Johnson, Briefing: The Crisis in South Sudan, 113 Aria. AHF. 451, 300-309 (Apr.
2014), http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/113/451/300.full.
14 Interview with Alex de Waal, Executive Director, World Peace Foundation (Sept. 14, 2016), http://
www.cfr.org/south-sudan/understanding-roots-conflict-south-sudan/p38298.
15 Carlo Koos & Thea Gutschke, South Sudan's Newest War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation,
GER~i. INST. ON GLOB. AN) AiEA STuD. Focus INT'L (May 2, 2014), https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publication/south-sudan%E2%80%99s-newest-war-when-two-old-men-divide-a-nation.
16 Skye Wheeler, South Sudan's New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, HUMAN
RIGHTs WATCH (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/07/south-sudans-new-war/abuses-
government-and-opposition-forces.
17 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, The Crisis in South Sudan, CONG. REs. SmRV. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www
.markswatson.com/south%20sudan%20-%20CRS.pdf.
18 Global Conflict Tracker, supra note 1.
19 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, U.N. Doc. S/2014/708,
U.N. SEC. COUNCIL (Sept. 30, 2014).
20 Global Conflict Tracker, supra note 1; South Sudan: Events of 2015, HUMAN RIGHrs WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/south-sudan (last visited Sept. 27, 2017); Letter
from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SOc. COUNCIL (Aug.21, 2015), http://www.un
.org/galsearch/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/656.
21 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, U.N. Doc. S/2014/537,
U.N. SEC. COUNCIL (July 25, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. S/2014/537]; U.N. Doc. S/2014/708, supra note 19;
U.N. Secretary-General, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Review of the Mandate of the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. S/2016/951, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL (Nov. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter Review of the Mandate]; Human Rights Council Res. 31/20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/31/20
(Apr. 27, 2016).
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ingly ethnic dimension, and hate speech is on the rise throughout the country,"
this raises concern that ethnic cleansing campaigns may occur similar to that
which occurred in Rwanda 22 Additionally, the violence resulting from the con-
flict prevented the planting or harvesting of crops as early as July 2014.23 This
led the UN Security Council to declare the food crisis in South Sudan as the
worst in the world.2 4 The UN Security Council estimates that four million people
could potentially be affected by the ongoing food crisis and die of hunger.2 5
B. International Response, and Previous Peace Agreements and Ceasefires
There have been numerous international responses to the conflict and it's
aforementioned effects.
In late December 2013 following the initial clashes between SPLM and
SPLM-IO, the UN Security Council through the United Nations Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan ("UNMISS") increased the interim troop level in South
Sudan to 12,500 peacekeeping personnel and 1,323 police personnel. 26 As of
September 2016, 18,000 peacekeeping troops, police and military observers
backed by the UN Security Council are present in South Sudan.27
In addition to the United Nations' role in attempting to achieve sustainable
peace in South Sudan, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development ("IGAD"), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Plus ("IGAD+") have participated by mediating numerous peace talks between
SPLM and SPLM-IO, resulting in numerous agreements between the parties. 28
The first direct negotiations between South Sudanese parties, mediated by IGAD,
occurred in January 2014.29 These negotiations ultimately resulted in the
"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Re-
public of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/
Army in Opposition (SPLM/A In Opposition)" of January 23, 2014.30 In the
following weeks, both parties violated the aforementioned ceasefire and the con-
22 Review of the Mandate, supra note 21; U.N.: 'Ethnic Cleansing Under Way' in South Sudan, Ai
JAZEERA NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/ethnic-cleansing-south-sudan-
161201042114805.html.
23 Global Conflict Tracker, supra note 1.
24 U.N. S/2014/537, supra note 21.
25 Review of the Mandate, supra note 21.
26 Global Conflict Tracker, supra note 1; UNMISS Mandate, U.N. MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF S.
SUDAN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
27 Jeffrey Gettleman, South Sudan to Allow More U.N. Peacekeepers, but Force Will Be No 'Pan-
acea', N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/world/africalsouth-sudan-un-
peacekeepers.html.
28 Interview with Dr. Getachew Gebrekidan, Visiting Scholar, Southern Voices Network, and John
Prendergast, Founding Director, The Enough Project in Washington, D.C. (July 16, 2015) https://www
.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-role-igad-regional-approach-to-the-crisis-south-sudan.
29 Press Release, Intergovernmental Auth. on Dev., Direct Negotiations Between South Sudanese
Parties (Jan. 6, 2014), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Press%2Release-%2Di-
rect%20negotiations%20between%20South%20Sudanese%20Parties%2C%206%20Jan%2714.pdf.
30 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan
(GRSS) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (In Opposition) (SPLM/A In Opposition),
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flict continued. 3 1 Despite the failure of this agreement to cease hostilities, IGAD
commenced operations in South Sudan to monitor the implementation and en-
forcement of this agreement through "monitoring and verification teams" in April
2014, in continuance of the mediation process. 32
Peace talks mediated by IGAD continued through April 2014.33 On May 9,
2014 both Kiir and Machar through their capacity as leaders of the SPLM and
SPLM-IO, respectively, committed to the cessation of hostilities and the creation
of a transitional government of national unity through an agreement mediated by
IGAD. 34 On June 10, 2014, Kiir and Machar committed to expedite and com-
plete negotiations to create a transitional government of national unity within
sixty days.3 5
On June 20, 2014, multi-stakeholder roundtable negotiations, mediated by
IGAD, began with the intention of implementing the cessation of hostilities re-
affirmed through the May 9, 2014 agreement, and establishing an agenda and
arrangements for the transitional government of national unity.3 6 However, the
SPLM-IO failed to attend the negotiations and the multi-stakeholder IGAD-led
peace talks adjourned on June 23, 2014.37 The violence continued and the par-
ties' failed to create a transitional government of national unity within sixty days
as set forth under the June 10, 2014 agreement. 38 On August 25, 2014, IGAD
threatened sanctions against SPLM and SPLM-IO if they did not reach an agree-
GRSS-SPLM/A, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTH. ON DEV. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://reliefweb.int/sites/re-
liefweb.int/files/resources/Agreement%20on%20Cessation%20of%20Hostilities_0.pdf.
31 South Sudan Profile - Timeline, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-14019202; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Concern About Violations of Cessation of
Hostilities in South Sudan (Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221487.htm.
32 Press Release, Intergovernmental Auth. On Dev., IGAD Monitoring and Verification Teams Com-
mence Operations in South Sudan (Apr. 11, 2014), http://igad.int/attachments/804_Press%20release%20
MVM%20team%2oCommence%200perations%20in%20South%2OSudan.pdf.
33 Press Release, Intergovernmental Auth. On Dev., Phase II of IGAD-Led South Sudan Talks Re-
sume in Addis Ababa (Apr. 28, 2014), https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCWFFac2dfbUd
iWFZqdGx2cFotRVJPYkYOUnIO/edit.
34 Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan, GRSS-SPLM/A (In Opposition), INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL AUTH. ON DEv. (May 9, 2014), https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/05/10/agreement-to-
resolve-the-crisis-in-south-sudan/.
35 Communique of the 26th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads Cf State and
Government on the Situation in South Sudan, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTH. ON DEV. (June 10, 2014),
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCZHhMYXE2WmdBVDNnaG5 I ejhtekVFbmlOZI Vn/
edit.
36 Press Release, Intergovernmental Auth. On Dev., Inclusive Negotiations for South Sudan
Launched: Stakeholders to Discuss Security and Transitional Government Arrangements (June 20, 2014),
https://docs.google.com/file/d/OB5FAwdVtt-gCZI NQRjNOMUlkWkRWUWtVQkVwbOR5MTNQZFB
F/edit.
37 Press Release, Intergovernmental Auth. On Dev., Multi-Stakeholder South Sudan Peace Talks Ad-
journ for Consultations (June 23, 2014), https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCRElfc2UtNjB
kcUx4MndPTI9XQWN4ckRMdGZF/edit.
38 South Sudan Rivals Sign New Ceasefire Deal, AL JAZEERA NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www
.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/08/south-sudan-ceasefire-deal-2014825135823800543.html; Communi-
que of the 27th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the
Situation in South Sudan, JNTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTH. ON DEv. (Aug. 25, 2014), https://drive.google
.com/file/d/OB5FAwdVtt-gCeURpOGdEZkRXNFBIZjhobXIIRUg3X315Tkx3/edit.
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ment for the formation of a transitional government of national unity in 45
days. 39 While the parties did not reach an agreement within the 45-day timeline,
they did, however, sign an agreement for the Re-Dedication of and Implementa-
tion Modalities for the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Signed on 23rd Janu-
ary 2014 Between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (In Opposition) on November 9, 2014.40
Within forty-eight hours the agreement to cease hostilities was violated when a
battle broke out between SPLM and SPLM-IO troops. 4 1 On January 21, 2015, the
parties signed the Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM.4 2 The agreement
included commitments to comply with the existing cessation of hostilities agree-
ments, to hold negotiations on a sustainable peace agreement, and to support the
establishment of an unspecified comprehensive system of transitional justice. 43
Due to the parties failure to comply with existing ceasefire agreements, on Febru-
ary 2, 2015, Kiir and Machar signed a new agreement which provided for a
ceasefire, committed to a final and comprehensive peace agreement by March 5,
2015, and confirmed agreed areas between the parties.4 Despite the "power shar-
ing" language contained in the agreement, Kiir and Machar failed to compromise
on a mutually agreeable "power sharing formula" and the violence continued. 45
Finally, on August 26, 2015 both parties signed the Agreement on the Resolution
on the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan under threat of UN sanctions,
despite Kiir's reservations.46 The signing of this peace agreement marked the
39 IGAD Gives South Sudanese Rivals 45 Days to End Conflict, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52166; South Sudan Rivals Sign New Ceasefire Deal, AL
JAZEERA NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/08/south-sudan-ceasefire-
deal-2014825135823800543.html; Communique of the 27th Extraordinary Session, supra note 38.
40 Re-Dedication of and Implementation Modalities for the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
Signed on 23rd January 2014 between GRSS-SPLM/A (In Opposition), INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTH. ON
DEV. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/272/CoH%20Implementation%20
Matrix%20and%2OAddendum%20signed%209%20%20November.pdf.
41 The Associated Press, South Sudan: Cease-Fire Ends After 48 Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/1 1/worldlafricalsouth-sudan-cease-fire-ends-after-48-hours.html.
42 Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM, SUDAN TRIll. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.sudan-
tribune.com/IMG/pdf/agreement-onreunification-of splm 210115_.pdf.
43 Id.
44 Reuters, Rebels Agree to Cease-Fire in South Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/02/02/world/africa/rebels-agree-to-cease-fire-in-south-sudan.htm; South Sudan Parties
Sign Areas ofAgreement on the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity, INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL AUTH. ON DEV. (Feb.2, 2015), https://igad.int/index.php?option=com content&view=ar
ticle&id= 1041: south-sudan-parties-sign-areas-of-agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-transitional-
government-of-national-unity&catid=1:1atest-news&ltemid=150.
45 Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on South Sudan, U.N. Secre-
tary-General (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2015-02-03/statement-attrib-
utable-spokesman-secretary-general-south-sudan; Press Release, Office of the UK Foreign Minister for
Africa, FCO Regrets Failure of South Sudan Leaders to Reach a Peace Agreement (Mar. 7, 2015), https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/fco-condemns-failure-of-south-sudan-leaders-to-reach-a-peace-agree
ment.
46 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council, in
Statement, Welcomes Peace Accord Signing by South Sudan's President, Affirming Readiness to Ensure
Full Compliance (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc I 2029.doc.htm [hereinafter Secur-
ity Council Press Release]; South Sudan President Salva Kiir Signs Peace Deal, BBC NEWS (Aug. 26,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34066511.
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first concrete and comprehensive step toward establishing a transitional govern-
ment of national unity and achieving sustaining peace in South Sudan.4 7
III. Discussion
While the parties' subsequently failed to abide by the permanent ceasefire pro-
vision of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan, this agreement establishes a transitional government of national unity,
Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, the Hybrid Court of South
Sudan, Compensation and Reparation Authority/Fund, parameters for a perma-
nent constitutions, and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. 48
A. Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan
The August 2015 peace agreement between SPLM and SPLM-IO was signed
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and witnessed by members of IGAD. 4 9 Kiir initially
refused to sign the agreement, but ultimately signed the document a full week
after Machar under the threat of a US-drafted resolution that would have imposed
an arms embargo and other targeted sanctions.50 Since the signing of the August
2015 peace agreement, the conflict has continued, and the parties have failed to
establish or enforce any of the agreement's provisions aside from those identified
below. 5 '
Chapter 1 of the August 2015 peace agreement commits the signatories to the
establishment of the transitional government of national unity of the Republic of
South Sudan ("TGoNU"). 52 Over a year after the ratification of the August 2015
peace agreement, Kiir in his role as President of South Sudan appointed the
TGoNU on April 28, 2016.53 Chapter 1 requires the TGoNU to hold elections
within sixty days of the transition period, thereby establishing a democratically
elected government. Additionally, this chapter establishes a "power-sharing ra-
tio" for composition of the TGoNU Executive Branch including the President,
First Vice President, Vice President, Council of Ministers and the Deputy Minis-
ters, and state governments. 54 Individuals indicted or convicted by the Hybrid
Court of South Sudan ("HCSS"), established in Chapter 5 of the August 2015
peace agreement, are not eligible for participation in the TGoNU or the following
47 Security Council Press Release, supra note 46.
48 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6.
49 Id.
50 South Sudan President Salva Kiir Signs Peace Deal, supra note 46.
51 Letter from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 2206 (2015) Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2016/963 (Nov.15, 2016), http://
www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/963.
52 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6.
53 South Sudan: Security Council Calls on Transitional Government to Implement Peace Accord, UN
NEWS CTR. (May 4, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=53854#.WG217bGZNsM
[hereinafter Security Council Calls].
54 Id.
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permanent government for a specified time to be determined by law, or if these
individuals are members of the TGoNU or its successor government, they will
lose their position in government.5 5 Chapter 1 establishes the responsibility of the
TGoNU for implementing the provisions of the agreement itself, and appointed
Kiir as President, Machar as First Vice President/ Vice President for the duration
of the Transition Period subsequent to change upon democratic elections. 56
Chapter 1 also establishes the Transnational Legislative Assembly, which is to be
replaced upon the end of the Transition Period by the National Legislative As-
sembly along with those members whom are democratically elected, and the Na-
tional Constitutional Amendment Committee.5 7
Chapter 2 of the August 2015 agreement provides for a permanent ceasefire;
establishes prohibited actions; commits the parties to a "Permanent Ceasefire and
Transitional Security Arrangements workshop"; establishes a "Temporary Na-
tional Architecture for the Implementation of Permanent Ceasefire" and unifica-
tion of forces; provides for the transition of the existing IGAD monitoring and
verification mechanism into the "Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrange-
ments Monitoring Mechanism"; and forms a "Strategic Defense and Security Re-
view Board".5 8
Chapter 3 establishes "agreed principles for humanitarian assistance and re-
construction", and a Special Fund for Reconstruction administered by the Board
of Special Reconstruction Fund".5 9
Chapter 4 provides for "resource, economic and financial management"
through the following means. 6 0 First, the TGoNU is required to review all na-
tional legislation specifically including the legislation governing the Bank of
South Sudan with the ultimate goal of restructuring, the Anti-Corruption Com-
mission Act and National Audit Chamber Act. Next, the TGoNU is required to
establish specified new institutions; to implement the provisions of the Petroleum
Revenue Management Act; expedite specified land policy and administration
measures; develop environmental protection policies; establish effective reve-
nues, revenue collection and revenue allocation. Finally, the TGoNU is required
to establish an effective public expenditure system and borrowing requirements;
establish various enterprise development funds; and establish an Economic and
Financial Management Authority 61 Additionally, this chapter requires the Minis-
try of Finance and Planning to develop a Strategic Economic Development
Roadmap. 62
Chapter 6 and 7 establish parameters for a permanent constitution and estab-
lish a "Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commissioner", respectively. Finally,
55 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6, at 45.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6, at 45.
62 Id.
124 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 15, Issue 1
The Hybrid Court of South Sudan
Chapter 8 concerns the supremacy of the August 2015 peace agreement over any
national legislation and provides procedures for the agreement's amendment. 6 3
B. Hybrid Court of South Sudan
Chapter 5 of the August 2015 peace agreement states agreed upon principles
for transitional justice, and commits the signatories to the establishment of "The
Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing ("CTRH"), the Hybrid Court
of South Sudan ("HCSS"), and the Compensation and Reparation Authority
("CRA").64
The CTRH requires at least a month-long period of public consultations to
accurately document the experiences of victims of the conflict with specific in-
quiry into human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law, and excessive
abuses of power committed against citizens of South Sudan.65 Additionally the
CTRH will recommend process and mechanisms to allow victims the right to
seek remedy for the crimes and abuses perpetrated against them.66
The HCSS is an independent hybrid judicial court to be established by the
African Union Commission with a mandate to investigate and prosecute individ-
uals criminally responsible for the perpetration of violations of international and/
or South Sudanese law committed from December 15, 2013 through the end of
the transitional period.6 7 The HCSS is independent from South Sudan's judiciary
and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission will appoint the seat,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and the registrar of the HCSS.6 8 In order to main-
tain impartiality, the majority of judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, and the
registrar are to be composed of individuals from African states other than South
Sudan.69 This chapter also permits the HCSS to use the African Union Commis-
sion of Inquiry on South Sudan and other existing materials, not limited to those
possessed by the African Union, in carrying out its investigations so long as the
use of these documents are in accordance with "applicable international conven-
tions, standards and practices."70
The TGoNU is further required through this Chapter to establish the Compen-
sation Reparation Fund ("CRF") and the Compensation Reparation Authority
("CRA") to manage this fund through the reception of applications of victims
that participated in the CTRH, and the dispensation of compensation and repara-
tion to these victims.7 1
63 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6, at 45.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6, at 43.
68 Id. at 43-44.
69 Id. at 43.
70 Id. at 44-45; Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, AU COM-
MISSION OF INQUIRY ON SOUTH SuoAN (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.executive
.summary.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
71 Id. at 45.
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IV. Analysis
To achieve the ultimate goal of the August 2015 peace agreement, sustainable
peace, the African Union Commission and the government of South Sudan must
take concrete steps toward the establishment of the HCSS. Furthermore, the es-
tablishment of the HCSS is preferable, for achieving national unity and sustaina-
ble peace, over the establishment of a national truth and reconciliation
commission as the sole form of transitional justice in South Sudan, as advocated
for by Kiir and Machar. 72
A. Argument in Support of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan
The African Union Commission, IGAD, IGAD+, UN, South Sudanese and
international non-governmental organizations, and certain South Sudanese civil-
ians all support and specifically call for the establishment of the HCSS as a
means of achieving sustainable peace, justice and criminal accountability.7 3 The
African Union Commission's final report on South Sudan (October 2014), rec-
ommended the "creation of a Africa-led, Africa-resourced legal mechanism
under the aegis of the African Union supported by the international community,
particularly the United Nations to bring those with the greatest responsibility at
the highest level to account." 74 This recommendation followed consultations and
interviews with numerous South Sudanese victims of the conflict, citizens, re-
gional and international leaders, civil society organizations and intellections, and
government and opposition officials.75 These consultations further revealed that
many South Sudanese view reconciliation as dependent upon justice and that
"those who committed atrocities should be prosecuted, and that victims and com-
munities are unlikely to embrace reconciliation otherwise, given the culture of
impunity in South Sudan." 76 As the ICC currently does not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute the crimes related to the conflict, and because of defi-
ciencies in South Sudan's current judicial system, the HCSS is the best means of
prosecution, so conditional to reconciliation in South Sudan.7 7
In addition to the aforementioned considerations, hybrid courts are lauded for
their domestic capacity for the following reasons. First, hybrid courts are gener-
ally located closer to the location of the crimes' commissions allowing for easier
participation by witnesses and victims and reducing costs. Second, hybrid courts
72 Kiir & Machar, supra note 7 (Machar has now disowned authorship on this piece).
73 Joint Letter: A Way Forward for the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov.
1, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/1 1/01/joint-letter-way-forward-hybrid-court-south-sudan-0;
Final Report, supra note 70. UN Rights Chief Urges Establishment of Hybrid Court for Atrocities in
South Sudan, UN NEWS CTR. (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=55801#
.WHF1c7YrJsM.
74 Final Report, supra note 70, at 24-25.
75 Id. at 6.
76 Id. at 25.
77 Looking for Justice: Recommendations for the Establishment of The Hybrid Court for South Su-
dan, AMNESTY INT'L & INT'L FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 2016) at 9-10, https://www.amnesty.org/
download/Documents/AFR6547422016ENGLISH.pdf.
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allow for the "insulation of the independence of the bench" through use of both
national and international judicial personnel. Third, hybrid courts have the poten-
tial to assist in strengthening the national judicial system through the interaction
between international and national judicial personnel. 78 Any challenges to the use
of a hybrid courts may be significantly decreased by the structure and organiza-
tion of the court as proposed in Section V.
Additionally, the relative success of the use of hybrid court in Sierra Leone
among other countries offers insight into the promise of the HCSS to ensure
justice and promote sustainable peace. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
("SCSL") was established by an agreement between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone.7 9 The SCSL was located in Sierra Leone and man-
dated to try those bearing the most responsibility for national and international
crimes committed during country's civil war.80 The SCSL composition included
both international and national judges and staff members, whom successfully
tried and convicted nine people prior to its transfer to a residual mechanism.8 1
Based on the above, the HCSS currently provides the best means of prosecu-
tion, punishment and redress for the people of South Sudan. As such, it's estab-
lishment pursuant to the August 2015 peace agreement must be pursued by the
AUC and the government of South Sudan.
B. An Examination of the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Despite signing the August 2015 peace agreement, Kiir and Machar jointly
wrote an article in the New York Times requesting the international community
and signatories to the agreement to reconsider the HCSS in favor of a "national
truth and reconciliation commission" as the sole form of transitional justice for
South Sudan. 8 2 The "national truth and reconciliation commission" would inves-
tigate and interview the people of South Sudan, with those who tell the truth
about their actions or events they witnessed receiving amnesty from prosecu-
tion.8 3 In advocating for this commission, Kiir and Machar argue for "truth, not
trials", stating that disciplinary justice would destabilize efforts to unite South
Sudan.84 However, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission
without a complementary judicial system for prosecution, such as the HCSS, will
not be effective. During the course of the conflict, the government of South Su-
78 Id. at 11; Ending the Era of Injustice: Advancing Prosecutions for Serious Crimes Committed in
South Sudan's New war, HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/12/
10/ending-era-injustice/advancing-prosecutions-serious-crimes-committed-south-sudans?ga=1.2279644
40.429423661.1399935943/.
79 Final Report, supra note 70; Elise Keppler, Dispatches: Giving Justice the Slip in South Sudan,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 8, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/dispatches-giving-justice-
slip-south-sudan; Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybiid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 299-300
(2003).
80 Final Report, supra note 70, at 12-14.
81 Id.
82 Spokesman Statement, supra note 45.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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dan has failed to prosecute human rights abuses committed against civilians and
has instead granted de facto amnesty to the perpetrators.8 5 As the conflict contin-
ues, it is clear that neither truth alone nor amnesty will provide the solution to
sustainable peace. Both the international community and many South Sudanese
people call for prosecution and accountability through the establishment of the
HCSS. 86 The "national truth and reconciliation commission" proposed by Kiir
and Machar is a self-serving effort to avoid prosecution and accountability for
their own roles in conflict-related crimes.8 7
Though complementary, truth alone is not an alternative to justice. For the
foregoing reasons, the establishment of the HCSS is preferable to the establish-
ment of a "national truth and reconciliation commission" as the sole means of
transitional justice for South Sudan.
V. Proposal
Since the signing of the August 2015 peace agreement, few concrete steps
have occurred to formally establish and implement the HCSS.8 8 Commitments
on a national level through the August 2015 peace agreement and on a continen-
tal level through the African Union Peace and Security Council's authorization
for the Chairperson of the AUC to take all steps necessary to establish the HCSS
provide sufficient authority for the AUC to establish the HCSS.8 9 Despite the
continuance of the conflict, delays in implementing other elements of the peace
agreement, such as the ceasefire agreement, should not hinder the establishment
of the HCSS. 90 It should be noted that the August 2015 peace agreement estab-
lished both the HCSS and the CTRH, so while the establishment of the HCSS is
crucial to achieving sustainable peace, justice and accountability, the HCSS and
the CTRH are not mutually exclusive. The HCSS may be effectively established
in conjunction with other forms of transitional justice as provided for in the Au-
gust 2015 peace agreement.
Through its authority in this capacity, the AUC should consider implementing
the following in establishing the HCSS.
First, as called for in an open letter to H.E. Mme. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,
Chairperson of the AUC, from South Sudanese and International Non-Govern-
mental Organizations, the AUC in consultation with the South Sudanese stake-
holders and individuals with relevant experience on international and hybrid
85 Spokesman Statement, supra note 45.
86 Letter from South Sudanese and International Non-Governmental Organizations, to H.E. Mme.
Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma (Nov. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Letter to Mme. Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma]; Final
Report, supra note 70; Keppler, supra note 79.
87 South Sudan's Kiir and Machar profited during war - report, BBC NEws (Sept. 12, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37338432.
88 Keppler, supra note 79.
89 Communiqud of 547th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (Sept. 26, 2015); Letter to Mme.
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, supra note 86.
90 H.E. Festus G. Morgae, On Status of the Implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic ofSouth Sudan (2016), http://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/reports/jmec-
quarterly-reports.
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justice tribunals should form a comprehensive draft statute for the HCSS. 9 1 This
draft should address the court's jurisdiction and location; composition of judges
and staff; provide for victim participation; victim and witness protection; public
outreach; rights of the accused, cooperation from national authorities; the court's
investigative branch; and the court's funding mechanism. 92
In addressing the most basic elements of the HCSS draft statute, the following
should be considered. The August 2015 agreement provides that the Chairperson
of the AUC will decide the seat of the HCSS, whether within South Sudan or
another country.93 South Sudan is the preferable location of the court as it better
facilitates witness, victim and public accessibility, increased public visibility, in-
creased understanding of South Sudan's culture by international members of the
Court's staff, and enhances the court's legitimacy in South Sudan. 9 4 However,
increased violence in the country provides a security risk to victims, witness, and
court personnel. Additionally, unless indicted or convicted by the HCSS, individ-
uals responsible for crimes remaining in positions of power may negatively influ-
ence witnesses, court personnel, or court proceedings.95 In considering the
composition of the court's judges and staff, the August 2015 peace agreement
provides that the majority of HCSS judges should be from African states other
than South Sudan. 9 6 The inclusion of qualified South Sudan judges is important
to increase the national legitimacy of the court, enhance capacity building,
knowledge and skills transfer from non-South Sudanese judges to South Suda-
nese judges to ensure the improvement of the domestic judicial system once the
HCSS has dissolved. 97 Currently, the most pressing matter for the court's estab-
lishment, which is to be addressed in the draft statute, is the creation of an inves-
tigation branch-the most immediate purpose of which is to collect and preserve
evidence for later use in HCSS trials.98 This investigative body may be estab-
lished before the rest of the HCSS, as has occurred in other international and
hybrid courts including the Special Criminal Court for the Central African
Republic.9 9
Second, though the August 2015 peace agreement provides the AUC with the
power to establish the HCSS, the agreement also requires that the TGoNU initi-
ate legislation necessary for the HCSS's establishment. 00 Though the AUC has
already provided numerous commitments to the HCSS's establishment, this will
likely require further commitment from the government of South Sudan.' 0
91 Keppler, supra note 79, at 2.
92 Id.; U.N. S/2014/537, supra note 21.
93 Security Council Calls, supra note 53.
94 Final Report, supra note 70, at 21-22.
95 Security Council Calls, supra note 53; U.N. S/2014/537, supra note 21 at 22.
96 Security Council Calls, supra note 53.
97 Final Report, supra note 70, at 22; Keppler, supra note 79; Final Report, supra note 70, at 21.
98 Keppler, supra note 79, at 2; Final Report, supra note 70, at 21.
99 Final Report, supra note 70, at 21; Keppler, supra note 79, at 2.
100 Agreement on Resolution, supra note 6, at 40.
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While this is not necessary for the AUC's draft of the aforementioned statute, an
agreement between the AUC and the government South Sudan pertaining to the
passive of proper legislation by the TGoNU should ultimately be considered.
VI. Conclusion
The HCSS offers the best means of achieving sustainable peace in South Su-
dan, as truth alone is not an alternative to criminal justice. Despite the continuing
conflict, the AUC should heed the call by both the South Sudanese and interna-
tional community to take concrete steps towards the court's establishment.
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